|
|
|
Seasoned Vet
 
Group: Past PNET Supporter
Last Login: 9/7/2005 7:22 PM
Posts: 6,666,
Visits: 289
|
|
http://www.strategypage.com/articles/ibct_files/part2.asp
Part 2 Battle Cruisers, Tank Destroyers, and Armored Cars
This section examines the evolution of the IBCT through some of its historical precedents: battle cruiser, tank destroyers, World War II Cavalry Groups of World War II, and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light). While there is no direct relationship between these organizations and the medium brigade, they all share features and it is instructive to look at the IBCT through historical eyes.
These seemingly disparate groups all have one thing in common: they were designed to fulfill a scouting or defense function and to allow the concentration of other forces for the main effort.
Battle Cruisers and Battle Ships
Admiral John "Jackie" Fischer invented both battle cruisers and the dreadnought or modern battleship giving the British Navy a significant advantage at the beginning of the twentieth century. The dreadnaught was a radical departure from earlier battleships because it concentrated on having a large single caliber main gun battery as opposed to several guns of mixed caliber.
The battle cruiser was designed to function independently, carried battleship armament and was faster then the battleship through increased power plants and lighter armor. Its job was to out gun, out run, and absorb hits from smaller vessels such as heavy cruisers, while evading other capital ships.
Tragically, the idea, which looked good on paper, did not fare so well in the real world. Germany quickly built its own battle cruisers with more armor and less speed and firepower, negating the British ships.
As a counter, the British formed their ships into squadrons and in this role; they functioned as scouts for the battle fleet. Once the enemy fleet was located, they would engage enemy battle cruisers in a fleet action or use their speed to engage the enemy battleships in conjunction with the friendly battle line.
This philosophy proved to be tragically flawed as shown at the Battle of Jutland where no less than three out of the five British battle cruisers were sunk with catastrophic explosions and the loss all but a handful of crewman while a fourth was severely damaged. Almost as Admiral Hood, commanding the Invincible, was killed, the HMS Hood was nearing the end of its construction.
The Hood of course, suffered from the same weaknesses of all battle cruisers, and was sunk by the Prinz Eugen or Bismark in the early days of World War II.
US Tank Destroyers in World War II
Tank Destroyers (TD) are rooted to the initial use of field artillery as anti-tank guns in World War I. The US developed TDs as a defensive measure in a very offensively minded army, perhaps dooming it to failure from the start against the rampage of the German panzers in the opening stages of World War II.
Colonel (later General) Andrew D. Bruce (who also commanded the very successful 77th Infantry Division in the Pacific) founded the US tank destroyer force. Initially, tank destroyers were to be employed in anti-tank platoons in infantry battalions, companies in infantry regiments, and independent battalions at the divisional level. Although initially successful in wargames in the US, their combat performance never quite lived up to the "live simulations" of the pre war years.
The US planned to employ TDs offensively, for this reason, like battle cruisers, they had big guns to kill enemy tanks and were fast with only light, open topped armor to allow them to concentrate.
The 1943 Self-propelled Tank Destroyer battalion was organized as shown in Figure 3. It was armed with the M10 (Sherman based with a 3 inch gun in an open turret), the M18 (a smaller, purpose built TD, with a high velocity 76mm gun), or the M36 (another Sherman variant with a 90mm gun – essentially identical to the M26 Pershing’s). The units were not to "slug it out with enemy tanks," instead, their cavalry units would find the enemy and guide the TD’s onto the enemy flanks, while their security detachments protected them from enemy infantry.
Tank destroyer were supposed to be employed in groups and even brigades to mass and defeat large groups of enemy armor, but by the time the US entered ground combat in World War II, the Germans seldom presented such large groups of tanks. Instead, they were usually attached out to divisions in small units. In the one or two instances when large groups of enemy tanks presented themselves, the TDs were unable to concentrate due to the poor communications of the period and the time it took to assemble.
They were useful as indirect fire artillery, direct fire artillery (knocking out bunkers or AT positions in support of infantry and armor attacks), and as reinforcements to tank platoons, able to deal with the heavily armored Panther and Tiger tanks.
Mechanized Cavalry In World War II
Mechanized cavalry evolved from the Army’s horse cavalry regiments between the two world wars and during the early years of World War II. Intended as a reconnaissance and security organization, it initially relied on stealth for its success. However, early failures in North Africa showed that cavalry doctrine and organization, with few weapons and dismounts, was flawed at the start.
After its initial use in combat, mechanized cavalry evolved into a combat arm as opposed to a purely reconnaissance arm. Results were successful, but costly, because cavalry units were not equipped with the heavy armor of tank units and had far fewer scouts for dismounted work than an armored infantry battalion.
Unlike tank destroyers units, cavalry groups actually commanded their squadrons, instead of having them routinely detached out to other units. The cavalry group, however, was comparatively weak, only consisting of two squadrons. It therefore had to put all its combat power in the line or only retain a small reserve. Also unlike tank destroyers, there were divisional cavalry squadrons. As such, the role and employment of cavalry has remained fairly steady up to the present day.
The 1943 cavalry squadron was organized much like today’s cavalry squadrons, with a headquarters troop, three cavalry troops, a tank company, and a howitzer battery. The cavalry troops had three reconnaissance platoons, as shown in Figure 4. This organization was stealthy enough to gain information without fighting and heavy enough to fight to gain information.
Key to the tactical success of the cavalry squadron was the Jeep, small, quiet, and nimble, it could get the cavalrymen out of trouble as quickly as it got him into it. Together with the dedicated 60mm mortars and high proportion of automatic weapons, and backed up with the M-8 Armored Car (a tank destroyer cast off), supported by the tank company and the assault gun battery, the squadron could also defend and attack, as well as carry out traditional cavalry missions.
USMC Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
The LAR Battalion (Figure 5) arose with the USMC’s realization that they were too light for contingencies in places like the Middle East, where nearly every country had large numbers of armored vehicles.
Although it was conceived of as a reconnaissance organization, the battalion was initially named the light armored infantry battalion. It has a similar organization to the Army’s proposed medium infantry battalions, consisting of 4 companies, each with three platoons of LAV-25, 4 LAV-Anti-tank TOW vehicles (wheeled versions of the M901 ITV), and 2 LAV-Mortar (81mm Mortars), plus assorted support vehicles. The battalion suffers from a lack of Anti-tank fires (no Javelin or Dragons) and only has four dismounts per carrier. It therefore requires augmentation from infantry, tank, and Assault Amphibian battalions for many missions. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact that it operates as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and as such, has an lethal air component to call upon for support.
The LAR battalion’s main roles are reconnaissance and security. Because the LAV is not armored to protect against anything larger than 7.62mm machine gun fire or 152mm artillery bursts at ranges of greater than 50 feet, it relies on its speed and stealth to avoid decisive engagement, just like battle cruisers, tank destroyers, and cavalry groups.
The LAR is at a severe disadvantage in offensive or defensive operations where the enemy has mobility equal to or greater than its own. Again, these faults are compensated for by the awesome combined arms power of the MAGTF.
LAR battalions performed well in the Gulf War, although one battalion suffered severely due to friendly fire. It has also performed well in large scale exercises in the southwestern United States.
The Light Armored Cavalry Regiment
The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment is the army’s "light" cavalry regiment and is descended from the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized) – themselves orphan’s of the high technology test bed division.
Its squadrons are organized much as a standard ACR (Figure 6), except armed with HMMWVs equipped with machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and TOW missiles instead of fighting vehicles and main battle tanks. It has a large amount of anti-tank weapons in the form of its TOWs and Javelins, but has virtually no armor protection. The HMMWVs were intended to be surrogate vehicles for more advanced vehicles to be developed, notably the M8 Armored Gun System, but these were all cancelled, and the result is an organization with high strategic mobility, poor armor protection, that is more dependent on stealth than its heavier brother.
The 2nd ACR could be characterized as a combination and evolution of World War II Tank Destroyer units (with its heavy hitting TOWs instead of tank destroyers) and the mechanized cavalry groups (with their HMMWVs instead of jeeps.)
The 2nd ACR has not been tested in combat, but has faired well in peacekeeping operations; however, it has not proved as successful as its heavy counterparts at the National Training Center. It is more fit for low intensity warfare and peacekeeping than high or medium intensity combat.
Historical Lessons Learned
1) Speed, stealth, and firepower are no substitute for protection
2) If it looks like a tank (battleship), it will get used like a tank (battleship).
3)Dismounted scouts or infantry are necessary for successful combat / reconnaissance operations.
4)If there is flawed doctrine, the troops will invent their own ways of employing a system.
5)Surrogate/interim vehicles tend to become permanent.
|
|
|
|
|
Seasoned Vet
Group: Past PNET Supporter
Last Login: 9/7/2005 7:22 PM
Posts: 6,666,
Visits: 289
|
|
Here is some historical info on the Daddy of the SBCT's:
In June 1983, when General John A. Wickham became the new Army Chief of Staff, he faced a serious conundrum. While the 9th Infantry Division was developing innovative concepts and ideas, the Army was still no closer to a light infantry division design. In addition, full implementation of HTLD couldn't be realized until new weapons like the armored gun system were available in the 1990s. General Wickham decided to split-off the light division design into a new study. He directed ADEA to concentrate its efforts on a less ambitious effort, developing a motorized division of about 13,000 men.
The motorized division design developed included three ground maneuver brigades with a mix combined arms (heavy), combined arms (light) and light attack battalions. The division also included a cavalry brigade (air attack) with attack aviation, reconnaissance and combat support aviation.
The certification test of the High Technology Motorized Division (HTMD), exercise LASERSTRIKE, took place in August 1984 at Yakima Firing Center. The exercise included over 20,000 soldiers and Marines as well as Air Force and Naval personnel.
In December 1984, General Wickham approved a 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) objective division design. The designers claimed the division was "fully capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world" and ready "to fight enemy armored forces upon arrival with great mobility and agility." During the next four years the 9th Infantry (Motorized) Division continued to adjust the design, evolving into a force that could fill the gap between the heavy and light divisions.
By 1988, however, the motorized division concept was in trouble. The Army was finding it difficult to justify maintaining multiple types of infantry divisions. In addition, reduced procurement funding no longer supported developing the armored gun system, the centerpiece of the motorized design. Finally, the Army had to cut end strength in the tactical forces. The motorized capability was determined to be least essential. The Army reorganized the division and its employment as an experimental test unit ended.
High Technology Test Bed
General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army between 1979 and 1983, had a number of concerns about the Army 86 effort. These concerns lead to less than full support for that design. He felt that the Army needed a force beyond the air assault and airborne divisions that it could deploy to such areas as the Middle East. He realized that even in Third World contingencies the U.S. would probably face a heavily armored opponent. He sought to replace the heavy equipment with lighter high technology to counter the anticipated enemy superiority in armor. The result was the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB), with the 9th Infantry Division experimenting with becoming a High Technology Light Division (HTLD).
The High Technology Test Bed made the 9th Infantry Division the proponent for its own design and fielding. The division was not positioned to build any Army-wide consensus. It was not even in a position to explain the importance of what it was doing to its major command, Forces Command (FORSCOM). That command became very concerned with the division's combat readiness during the testing and development of the HTTB. Not being in direct touch with the TRADOC schools and centers meant that the division could not draw on their expertise nor include them in the marketing of the final results. Finally, the division was not in a position to explain why the high technology equipment was so important to the design to the those on the Army Staff who needed to defend its requirements to Congress.
The 9th Infantry Division bore the burden of providing the funds for the equipping of the High Technology Test Bed. Though it received resources from both TRADOC and FORSCOM initially, those commands did not have programmed money available for the effort, and increasingly had competitive requirements for their limited funds as time went on. The equipment initiatives of the test bed needed to get into the budget programming cycle of the Army. The command responsibilities prevented or delayed the insertion of the required funding. In 1983, the Department of the Army (DA) redesignated the High Technology Test Bed as the Army Development and Employment Agency, making it a field operating agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. This provided both essential contact with the DA staff, and also access to more normal funding. However, this action occurred when the focus ofthe senior Army leadership was already turning towards the Army of Excellence Light Division design.
The High Technology Light Division did not develop a force light enough to deploy in the available airlift. The division also did not have enough combat power to face a heavy force in the open. Though the effort identified a number of equipment enhancements, it was unable to secure Congressional authorizations for many of the pieces of necessary equipment, nor could it test the concept of the division adequately with substitute equipment. Controversial test methods also weakened the credibility of the test bed. Critical to the HTTB failure as a force design effort was the inability of a division to secure the support of the Major Commands (to include its own higher headquarters), even when it had the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army. As the size of the designed division grew to the manning levels that the Army 86 Infantry Division had envisioned, the warfighting Commanders in Chief questioned whether the division was worth including in their war plans for deployment.
|
|
|
|
|
Trooper
Group: Past PNET Supporter
Last Login: 1/2/2005 11:44 AM
Posts: 784,
Visits: 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ei Temporis Vita Semper Resumo Sese
Group: Moderators
Last Login: Yesterday @ 8:23 AM
Posts: 8,493,
Visits: 7,618
|
|
M1 Abrams, no matter the model, all have Chobham... on the M1A1HA and up, a DU waffle waffer was sandwiched in the middle of the steel & ceramic composite and it's density adds incredible resistance to the mix. We are the only nationin the world to use DU both in our tank armor and as a projectile.
"The degenerative and loony should never be denigrated but, rather, thanked. In their absence, the rest of you would be obliged to fill congressional seats... positions naturally unsavory to the sane and honorable." Thorax
|
|
|
|
|
Trooper
Group: Past PNET Supporter
Last Login: 1/2/2005 11:44 AM
Posts: 784,
Visits: 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
Anti-social
Group: Past PNET Supporter
Last Login: Today @ 2:50 PM
Posts: 1,890,
Visits: 13,046
|
|
The evolution of our Armored forces in WW2 was a tragedy and a crime IMO. We were always a step behind the Germans in this area. We were building under-armored Shermans with a low-velocity gun, while the Germans were building heavily armored Panthers and Tigers with high-velocity guns. LTG McNair was the main mover behind the organization of our armored forces and his logic was this: (paraphrasing) We don't need heavy tanks because our tank units are meant for exploitation and to attack enemy infantry and other soft targets while our AT and TD units are meant to take on enemy armor. Sounds good in theory, but it didn't take into account that the enemy also has a say. And of course Germans didn't cooperate since they discovered after long experience in Russia and N. Africa that the best anti-tank defense is another tank. So our poor Shermans ended up confronting Panthers and Tigers regularly. I think the 3rd AD lost like 90 tanks to advance something like 5 or 6 klicks when it first arrived in Normandy. The thinking then was 'well we can afford to lose alot more Shermans than the Germans can Panthers and Tigers' and this was true. But as Gen. Bradley pointed out, that willingness to expend Shermans was fine except that the crews were forced to expend themselves as well. And I love the concept behind the TD units. They were thin-skinned because they weren't going to take on enemy armor head-on but would scoot around to the flanks to take him on! Great but what if the enemy is not exposing any
flanks? What if he is more adept at manuever than you are? 'Flanking' the enemy is sometimes easier said than done. Once again, not taking into account that the enemy also has a say.
I'll give the Army one thing though, they did finally get it right with the M1s and Bradleys. They are some kick-ass vehicles.
Sorry for the digression...
1/508th Abn Inf, 82nd Abn Div 81-83 1/4th Inf (Mech), 3rd Inf Div (USAEUR) 83-84 SGT\EIB\Recondo "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies." - Groucho Marx
|
|
|
|
|
Seasoned Vet
Group: Registered User
Last Login: 10/2/2005 10:13 PM
Posts: 5,502,
Visits: 70
|
|
| | |