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Ei Temporis Vita Semper Resumo Sese
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Fellas... I hate to say it but we are darn close to reinstituting a draft. One more conflict and we'll have to...
"The degenerative and loony should never be denigrated but, rather, thanked. In their absence, the rest of you would be obliged to fill congressional seats... positions naturally unsavory to the sane and honorable." Thorax
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Trooper
 
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Hard Charger
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quote:
Originally posted by CHERRY
Sorry, I should clarify. Four rifle platoons. But, I think having four Brigades is a better Idea. From what I have read, the Wolfhounds were a Infantry regiment, but was used for assualts, no static defence or trench warfare. Thats what I mean. With four brigades in a division, one could be used for stuff like that.
But im not sure about the Raiders, I thought they were Battalion sized units used in the pusan defence as a quick reaction force.
The Wolfhounds are the 27th Infantry Regiment: http://www.kolchak.org/
[image]http://www.25idl.army.mil/images/unitcrests/crest_204.gif[/image]
They were part of the 25th ID in Korea, under John H. "Iron Mike" Michaelis. They were a normal infantry regiment that was part of the occupation of Japan after WWII, and went to Korea in 1950. Because their state of training and readiness was far higher than other regiments in the Division, or in Eighth Army for that matter, they wound up being considered a "fire brigade" during the defense of the Pusan perimeter, being moved to wherever the situation was hottest. Added laurels to an already stellar reputation. My grandfather commanded the regiment from 1947-1948 in Japan.
The Raiders you're thinking of Cherry may be the "Wolfhound Raiders" that Hackworth commanded, as sort of an informal Ranger company for the 27th INF in Korea, after the Ranger companies were disbanded.
"EBO isn't a strategy. It's a sales pitch." - Ralph Peters
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Hard Charger
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| The US is at war and Afghanistan and Iraq are but campaigns in that effort. I think its important to rotate the 3ID back to the US and bring over the 1 CAV Div. Also the NG should have 25% of its combat units deployed to Iraq to help in stablization. The new Iraqi Army needs to be stood up as quickly as possible. The effort to set up a working Iraqi police force is working well. We need a massive display of force to control the country and to get the Syrians-Iranians out of the picture. That means more troops.
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Seasoned Vet
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| Roger Tomahawk, I agree. It also might be a good time to test the recently combat certified SBCT out over there in Stability Operations. I also believe that the Army needs to send most of the MP units in the US Army (active, guard, and reserve) over there.
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Got Silk?
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quote:
I think what we have to do is return the 101 to Jump Status.
WHOA there, let's not get carried away here!
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ArmyParatrooper.org
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Hard Charger
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Yes the MP brigades could prove to be a useful addition to stabilization perhaps even essential. The deployment of an MP battalion in a town sends a dif message than an infantry battalion. A completely different feel. The SECDEF needs to bite the bullet, admit he was wrong and make the changes needed to stop the opposition before they really gain ground. The reality is our allies dont have the manpower to contribute 100,000 peacekeepers on top of our 150,000. Only the US has that capability and the politicians must accept that fact.
Here is an interesting army times article about the future of mobilization.
Issue Date: July 07, 2003
CentCom’s next-in-command urges mobilization overhaul
By Vince Crawley
Times staff writer
The general named to be the next commander of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region says his combat capabilities in Iraq were hampered by outdated rules for calling up reservists.
But Pentagon officials say plans to retool the reserves, if approved by Congress, would take the rest of this decade to accomplish.
Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, previously the deputy chief of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 25 that old-fashioned reserve-mobilization policies need to be overhauled for the 21st century.
Abizaid will succeed Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the Central Command chief who planned to retire June 30. The Senate on June 26 swiftly approved Abizaid’s nomination for promotion to four-star rank and his reassignment.
In written responses to questions prepared for his June 25 confirmation hearing, Abizaid criticized the entire active-duty and reserve force-deployment process.
Today’s procedures for sending troops overseas is “Cold War vintage” and was not flexible enough to meet ever-changing political realities as U.S. leaders sought basing and overflight rights in the war against Iraq, he said.
“Inefficient and rigid” reserve-mobilization policies and systems “must also adapt to the more fluid force deployment and employment model we see in the future,” Abizaid said.
Many reserve units provide active forces with critical combat support and service support, and he said there were times in Iraq when these “enablers” arrived late “as a result of our current cumbersome mobilization and deployment system.”
As part of an overhaul of reserve missions, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wants to eliminate as many involuntary call-ups as possible during the initial phase of major campaigns, Pentagon personnel chief David S.C. Chu told reporters in mid-June.
In legislation proposed earlier this year, Rumsfeld’s staff sees a “continuum of service” instead of the traditional reserve role of serving one weekend per month and two weeks each summer.
The Pentagon wants to allow reservists to be mobilized for longer or shorter periods, depending on the mission. Chu has said many reservists would volunteer for longer stints, while other high-tech specialists might only be needed for a few critical days each year. In addition, the Pentagon wants to create a body of trained reservists who would be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy in a matter of days.
Reservists were heavily called up during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the aftermath of that conflict and the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon, under then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, studied the mix and missions of reserve and active-duty units. However, during the 1990s drawdown, the services chose to place many combat-support roles in the reserves, mainly to maintain the number of heavy-combat “trigger pullers” on active duty.
The argument that reserve call-ups are a litmus test of national will “is based on a false premise ... that the reserves somehow aren’t a volunteer force,” Chu said. “They’re just as much a volunteer force as the active forces.”
That, he said, is the main reason there has been so little public griping by the many reservists called up for the war against terrorism or to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These reservists often are “asked to do very hard things on very short notice at considerable personal burden — because they agreed that their service was necessary,” he said. “So I’m not sure I understand the distinction between an active unit to do the nation’s business and sending a reserve unit.”
Even if Rumsfeld does shift many of today’s reserve missions to active forces, such a change likely would take years.
“This is not something you’re going to see next month,” Chu said, although he is hopeful that in “the next year or two” military planners would be able to start placing far more volunteers into early-deployment reserve units as well as retool active units for early stages of deployments.
The first significant changes would be proposed as part of the 2005 defense budget proposal, to be unveiled next February.
But Chu cautioned that the Pentagon would not rush the reserve transformation. Among other things, he noted, “it takes a while to constitute a successful unit. These aren’t going to happen overnight.”
The big problem with using individual fillers in deploying RC units is unit cohesion. Its the opposite of what the Army wants to do with the active forces. Again the SECDEF doesnt want more active duty people which is really what is needed. The Army needs 75,000 additional troops. Or if 75,000 Army jobs are civilianized then I suppose those personnel could form additional combat units. In any event the only way to remove strain on the RC is more active duty units. If we can go to war without a major call up then we may see big cuts in the NG and USAR. The NG doesnt need combat units for homeland defense, just MP units. We may see an MP brigade formed in each medium size state with multiple brigades in large states.
The 8 NG divisions would be reduced to 4. Keep 12 enhanced brigades.
Keep 8 NG FA brigades. Cut the NG ADA brigades. Keep the current mix of support units. Add additional ACR's for patrolling the Mexican border. Finally the idea of 1 weekend a month,2 weeks a year is out.
Maybe form units of reservists who work 2 weeks a month or for a 6 month active stint then 6 months of say 1 weekend per month. Enable RC retirement at age 55 with all RC benefits.
Conversely the active Army would grow from 10 to 14 combat divsions.
Additional MP units. I would throw in 2 more ACR's and get the 11 ACR out of its opfor role make it combat capable.
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