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Seasoned Vet
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July 01, 2003
Battery commander deemed negligent in fatal Drum accident
Associated Press
FORT DRUM, N.Y. — An artillery captain was relieved of his job after an investigation determined he was negligent and his “demanding, demeaning behavior” contributed to the death of two soldiers in a live-fire training exercise last year, according to an Army report.
Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Goedkoop concluded that the officer failed to follow standard procedures and stressed a group of inexperienced soldiers into making fatal errors that sent two cannon shells more than a mile off target in March 2002 at Fort Drum in northern New York.
The shells burst near a mess tent where members of the 110th Military Intelligence Battalion were eating breakfast, getting ready for a day of rifle practice on a nearby range. The explosion killed two soldiers and injured 13 others.
Goedkoop, Fort Drum’s acting commander at the time, investigated the accident and concluded in a May 2002 report that both the battery commander and the fire direction officer “acted in a negligent manner by failing to follow several procedures which should have prevented this accident.”
Goedkoop noted that he found no deliberate intent to harm other soldiers. The Army blocked out the names of the soldiers involved before releasing the nine-page document, which was first reported on Tuesday by The Watertown (N.Y.) Daily Times.
Maj. Dan Bohr, a post spokesman, said Tuesday that Fort Drum officials had no additional comment.
The captain was relieved of his command of Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 15th Artillery Regiment, in May 2002, based on Goedkoop’s recommendation. He has since left the Army. The fire direction officer and a noncommissioned officer were reassigned. Retraining was ordered for other soldiers in the unit, which has since been deployed to Iraq.
Last June, the Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., issued a safety notice, citing inadequate training, operator error and complicated fire control software as contributing causes of the accident that killed Pfc. William Hamm, 34, of Ocala, Fla., and Staff Sgt. Eric Hall, 34, of Phoenix.
According to Goedkoop’s report, Battery C had difficulties from the outset of its training mission, which began March 19. The initial site was unsuitable, so the unit had to move its 105mm howitzers nearly a mile, then had trouble setting up its digital and wire communications.
Though recently trained on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, the fire direction officer and computer operator that night made a mistake computing for the safety zones for the next day’s shelling practice. The report said the noncommissioned officer in charge was not around to check. As battery commander, the captain said he checked the figures, but evidently did not catch the mistakes.
Investigators found the captain also misjudged on a map the distance to the impact area by using “his thumb and little finger to estimate range to the target,” the report said.
On March 20, the scheduled 6 a.m. firing practice had to be delayed an hour until radio contact could be established between the guns. When it was, the captain gave the order to fire registration rounds, initial shots that are used to help adjust targeting.
Investigators found that the computerized firing system reverted to default values for wind speed, powder temperature and altitude because correct information was not properly entered.
“Because of the pressure ... to get a round down range, the fire direction officer hurried the computer operator, who failed to enter some of the mission data into the computer,” the report said.
The fire direction officer also failed to check the firing data manually as required by the battalion commander and standard procedure.
The report noted the crew was inexperienced and some members inadequately trained.
A more significant factor was the command climate, which created “undue stress” on the battery, the report said.
“All soldiers interviewed indicated that the battery commander was not well respected for his leadership style. His demanding, demeaning behavior negatively affected everyone around him,” the report said.
Goedkoop also recommended additional safety procedures
------------------------------------------------------------ Albert Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. ------------------------------------------ 
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Seasoned Vet
 
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| Oh my, this is sad, but it sounds just like the basic training company commander in 'Stripes' out on the mortar range.
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Strac Trooper
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I was working as a Desk Sgt when this happened. As a matter of fact it happened about 1hr before I was to get off shift. I have a buddy that is in that unit and he told me what happened. What he said was pretty much what happened. After the rounds fell short the BC went to every NCO and called them all pieces of sh*t. One thing that isnt mentioned in the article though is that the MI unit was set up almost right on top of the edge of the impact area. Now dont get me wrong Im not saying the MI unit is to blame. I saw the pictures of the area after the explosion. They should be lucky it wasnt a 155 rounds or alot more wouldve happened. What was also screwed up was that the Coroner had one of the bodies flew to the hospital. I guess he knew Goedkoop or something and had it done beacuse he refused to come to the sence. I also saw the pictures of the bodies. One guy was right at the impact area and died right away. What also isnt mentioned is that 2 guns fired instead of one. Therefore 2 rounds hit the area not one. Alot of the NCOs did hate the BC and wished he would leave. Guess they got their wish.
[mp][wingflag][rigger][E5][swasia]
"The sergeant is the Army." - General Dwight D. Eisenhower
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Strac Trooper
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From what my Buddy was telling me was that the FDC was not double checked. I was also told that the guns where set at a almost flat projection. I think it was 45 degrees. I was also told that the Safty Officer was on the line checking the guns. Now I know nothing about guns but pull string go boom, so please dont shoot the messenger. Im only telling you what I was told. I know that the Battery had to guard the site till the MPs got there and as the MI unit drove by they flipped off ever Arty guy that was there. Needless to say tensions where high at the club for awhile.
[mp][wingflag][rigger][E5][swasia]
"The sergeant is the Army." - General Dwight D. Eisenhower
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Hard Charger
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You hit the nail on the head with your last post ABN FDC. The CO is ultimately resposnible, whether he was a tyrant or freakin' Ghandi.
"EBO isn't a strategy. It's a sales pitch." - Ralph Peters
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Hard Charger
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Did he say stress on the soldiers, sorry, never been in a Battery that didn't have stress in the Field. The reason for that is because when someone calls for fire they want accurate responsive fires. It is the nature of the beast to hurry and have stress. To use stress in the equation is to act like it can be removed. Well it isn't going away, so that should nto be factored in.
quote:
According to Goedkoop’s report, Battery C had difficulties from the outset of its training mission, which began March 19. The initial site was unsuitable, so the unit had to move its 105mm howitzers nearly a mile, then had trouble setting up its digital and wire communications.
There is something wrong with this, every Battery in the world has had to move and they have all done it, so to me that is something that happens every day. The battery had trouble setting up its digital and wire communications, well generally speaking the wire communications is to the guns, so whatever that means I don't know. They couldn't talk to the guns, BN FDC, FIST, who couldn't they talk to???
quote:
Though recently trained on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, the fire direction officer and computer operator that night made a mistake computing for the safety zones for the next day’s shelling practice. The report said the noncommissioned officer in charge was not around to check. As battery commander, the captain said he checked the figures, but evidently did not catch the mistakes.
With this and the statements about complicated software, the questions I have are; 1. Was the data entered correctly even if it was wrong. 2. What does not around mean, does it mean he was in the Hospital, on detail, serving Chow, what does not around mean? And I have only seen the BC check data one time, and that is because there is a PLT Leader and perhaps an XO that would also do that. I know XVIII ABC has the most intense certification program I have ever seen.
quote:
Investigators found the captain also misjudged on a map the distance to the impact area by using “his thumb and little finger to estimate range to the target,” the report said.
Makes me wonder who was observing for the unit and how they sent the target data. This one statement alone makes it sound like the Battery was in the field by themselves and had no sensor to shooter link.
quote:
On March 20, the scheduled 6 a.m. firing practice had to be delayed an hour until radio contact could be established between the guns. When it was, the captain gave the order to fire registration rounds, initial shots that are used to help adjust targeting
Ok, between the guns, how far apart were they, I mean a Battery front should be anywhere from 200-500 meters, and they use wire(mostly). It may have been a registration and one of the gun chiefs screwed up and shot with the registering piece.
quote:
“Because of the pressure ... to get a round down range, the fire direction officer hurried the computer operator, who failed to enter some of the mission data into the computer,” the report said.
The fire direction officer also failed to check the firing data manually as required by the battalion commander and standard procedure.
The report noted the crew was inexperienced and some members inadequately trained.
A more significant factor was the command climate, which created “undue stress” on the battery, the report said.
Sorry, the pressure and stress isn't going away, when someone down range wants rounds, you don't have time to worry about stress, you do your job, the requirement is responsive and accurate fires, anything less is unacceptable. In the Field Artillery there is an idependant second check on every piece of data that is computed and fired at the Battery Level, so either it was not done or it was at least two people who were wrong. Every BN I have been in had a certification requirement, there should never be a question of inadequate training, either you are certified or you are not, and that includes the leadership in every section (BC, XO,PL,FDO, FDC Chief, Smoke and the Gunnery SGT have individual certifications and the FDC Section and gun sections have a section certification)
quote:
Goedkoop also recommended additional safety procedures
There are enough safety procedures in place, they did not follow them.
It could have been the guns if the Gunnery SGT laid them on the wrong AOF or had the wrong ORSTA data, or it could have been a survey error (WHICH I HAVE NEVER SEEN) that would account for two guns firing what they thought was safe data. That whole safety officer deal is not an accurate picture. The Howitzer Section Chief is responsible for every round he shoots. The FDC Chief is responsible for all data he computes. There is not one person who goes around checking the guns before they shoot. There is a safety certified person, normally a SFC or above required to be on the firing point, but that is usually a Range Control issue. (to open the range) The bottom line is that it is the Chief of Firing Battery's gunline. On each gun, the only person who can authorize the firing of the weapon is the section chief, he is the ultimate authority on whether the gun fires or not, just as the FDC chief gives the ok to send the data to the guns. Smoke controls the Battery/PLT, Section Chief controls the Gun Section and the FDC Chief controls the Fire Direction section. If the Data computed was bad data, then the FDO and chief got off easy. The Commander is not a scapegoat. He IS responsible for all that goes right or wrong in his Battery, whether he is on the firing point or not.
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Detachment Sergeant
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I know the MI soldiers that were hit in this tragic incident. I point no fingers, and can't place any blame. It was a terrible accident. We have to train; we'll suck in wartime if we don't. You can't absolve a man for making a mistake, but it's difficult (to me) to blame one man for such a tragic incident.
 ALWAYS OUT FRONT
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