Urban Battles Highlight Shortfalls in Soldier Communications
by Sandra I. Erwin
The chaotic door-to-door warfare seen in Iraq offers glaring proof that dismounted U.S. troops need better communications devices, experts contend.
A team of observers from the U.S. Army Infantry Center, at Fort Benning, Ga., spent several weeks in Iraq last year, alongside combat units from the 101st Airborne, 4th Infantry and 82nd Airborne divisions. Of particular interest to the team was the effectiveness of the units’ tactics and equipment in an urban battlefield.
In most cases, soldiers were operating in small groups of three to five, entering and clearing buildings, and arresting suspected insurgents.
It did not take long for observers to conclude that the lack of functional radios hampered soldiers’ ability to execute their missions without undue risk.
Current Army line-of-sight radios in many instances proved inadequate for urban operations, because the signals could not penetrate the thick masonry walls and surrounding fences of many Iraqi buildings. Satellite radios are not the answer, because they don’t work inside buildings. As a workaround, soldiers in some instances would enter a building and leave a radio at the door as a “bread crumb” that provided a relay point once the soldiers were inside and their satellite signals got blocked.
When the radios failed, soldiers resorted to the only available and reliable form of communication: screaming.
Yelling their positions clearly put the soldiers in danger, the Infantry Center team concluded, and prompted efforts at Fort Benning to seek funds for new radios.
Unlike current military handheld radios, the devices best suited for urban combat are so-called “network radios,” according to Infantry Center analysts. These terrestrial radios feature “frequency hopping” technology, which allows them to reroute the transmission around obstacles, until the message reaches the intended target. Everyone who has a radio acts as a relay. Low-flying unmanned aircraft also can function as relays.
The Infantry Center plans to evaluate several types of network radios. An Army source said that at least seven to eight vendors would provide candidate radios for testing.
Among the systems to be evaluated is a pocket-sized Internet-capable radio called Microlight. The Army already is purchasing the 1.4-pound radio for the “land warrior” next-generation infantry modernization program. Under land warrior, the Army intends to provide soldiers with miniaturized communications and navigation systems so that members of a squad, for example, can operate in a large area and stay connected to one another via secure radios and computers.
That is not possible with current radios, because they don’t have enough range and are limited to line-of-sight connectivity. Land warrior, however, will be fielded in small numbers, to perhaps 10 percent of the Army. The Infantry Center is turning its focus to the other 90 percent.
“Soldiers in Iraq don’t have any secure communications for urban close in fighting,” said Tim Strobel, director of wideband data link programs at the Raytheon Company, which developed the Microlight radio. “Their current tactics are flat out dangerous … They run up and down hallways, yelling their positions, shouting out windows.”
The Army has yet to field effective technologies for urban warfare, for several reasons, Strobel noted. One is a “lack of focus on the Army’s part.” Another inhibiting factor has been the slow progress by the industry in slashing weight and power requirements. Dismounted soldiers are unlikely to employ any system that weighs too much or requires frequent battery replacements. Batteries alone can add several pounds to a soldier’s already overburdened rucksack. A radio also has to be simple to operate, so soldiers can keep their hands on their weapons.
The technology that has helped miniaturize cell phones and other commercial electronic devices is mature enough to be transitioned into military radios and handheld command-and-control computers, Strobel said.
Another radio supplier, ITT Industries, unveiled a 1-pound military network radio, also designed for urban operations, said Larry Williams, director of business development.
In recent months, the Infantry Center shipped an undisclosed number of network radios to Iraq, said an Army source, who declined to identify the type or model. But the reality is that the dismounted soldier has not been a top priority when it comes to buying communications systems in the Army, the source said.
The lack of radios for squad and team leaders is not a new problem by any means. Experts note that similar issues were experienced in Vietnam, where many operations were carried out by small units.
Since the beginning of the Iraqi conflict, the Army has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to equip units with satellite communications systems, which have proved invaluable in a war zone where platoons and battalions cover large areas and need to be able to stay in touch with higher command. But satellite receivers don’t work inside buildings, leaving small units without reliable communications when they fight counterinsurgency operations in built-up areas. Further, there are not enough radios to equip every soldier.
“The operations in Iraq are very decentralized,” said the Army official. “That drives up the need for more radios.”
The U.S. Infantry Center has requested funds to buy large quantities of network radios during the next two to three years.
The Army already is addressing the need for small-unit network radios under the joint tactical radio system program, but that technology is not scheduled to be in operation until at least 2010. “We need something we can field in the next two to three years,” the Army official said.
It is not yet clear how much these radios will cost. The level of encryption is the largest cost driver. The most secure radios, with type 1 encryption, are the most expensive. Industry experts said the Army could expect to see price tags in the “low thousands” for each radio.
Given the big-ticket prices of satellite communications systems, the Army should not balk at the cost of the network radios, the official said. There is an institutional bias in the Army favoring high-level communications for command posts and vehicles, which don’t necessarily help foot soldiers, he added.
The official blamed this bias on the fact that most general officers in the Army today haven’t been platoon leaders in 20-25 years. “They know more about brigade and division level communications. The lower echelons don’t get the same level of attention. … Big, fancy satellite communications systems are what industry pushes, too. Small radios are not sexy.”
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Sep/Urban_Battles.htm